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Abstract
The traditional identity-based cryptography requires a user who holds multiple identities to
keep multiple private keys, where each private key is associated with an identity. Managing mul-
tiple private/public keys is a heavy burden for a user in terms of key management and storage.
The recent advances of identity-based cryptography allow a single private key to map multiple
public keys (identities), which simplifies the private key management. Unfortunately, the existing
schemes do not allow dynamic changes of identities and have a large data size proportional to the
number of the associated identities. To overcome these problems, in this paper, we present an effi-
cient and dynamic identity-based key exchange protocol and prove its security under the Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Our protocol requires a relatively small
bandwidth for a key agreement communication, in comparison with other existing schemes.
Keywords: Identity-based Key Management; Provable Security; Informatics Security.
1 Introduction
The notion of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [15]. The identity-based cryp-
tography exhibits the feature of simplicity in public key management, since an user identity such as
an email address can be used as a public key. The private key associated with a user’s identity is
created by the Private Key Generator (PKG) using its master key. Although identity-based cryptogra-
phy has exhibited many useful features and many concrete identity-based cryptosystems are proposed
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18], an obvious key management issue raises, when a user holds multiple
identities used as his public keys, since multiple identities lead to multiple private keys.
Multiple identities are very useful for authenticated key distribution. In order to prevent false
identification due to identity theft, in common practice, a client is often required to provide his/her
multiple identities such as his/her name, driver’s license number, bank account number, etc., for
applying for a credit card for instance. While a client wants to access his/her taxation information,
he/she needs to provide his/her name, tax number, etc. Such applications are usually asymmetric,
namely the client and the server can provide different types of identifications. Managing multiple
private/public keys is unfortunately a burden for a user. Moreover, using multiple private keys and
public keys in a key agreement protocol could cause a high computational complexity.
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To simplify private key management for a user with multiple identities, we seek a solution that
multiple identities can be mapped to a single private key. Guo, Mu, and Chen [10] firstly introduced an
encryption scheme that provides a solution of multiple identities. Based on [10], Guo, Mu, Zhang, et al.
[12] presented a novel authenticated key agreement protocol. To prove the security of their scheme in
the random oracle model, they introduced a new assumption called n-multiple bilinear collision attack
assumption (n-MBCAA1). Although the solutions due to [10, 12] are elegant, they have a relatively
high computational complexity, because the computational cost of the scalar multiplication operations,
which were adopted in their schemes, is proportional to the number of identities (say n). Later, Guo,
Mu, Chen and Xu [11] presented a more efficient encryption scheme in the selective-identity model
based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem. The scalar multiplications on the
elliptic curves in their scheme is still proportional to the number of identities (say n). Very recently,
Guo, et al. [13] presented a new efficient key agreement protocol using matrix theory based on Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (BDH). In their scheme, the number of the scalar multiplications on the elliptic curves
is proportional to the number of the selected identities (say, k (k < n)). None of these schemes offers
a low communication cost. Although Guo, et al.’s scheme [13] is the most efficient one in terms of
the number of the messages, the number of the messages in their scheme is still proportional to the
number of the selected identities k.
Apart from the issues of computational complexity, communication complexity and security proofs,
we believe that a complete multi-identity scheme should capture the feature of dynamic changes of user
identities. Actually, some practical applications require the users to change their identities from time
to time. For example, online payment systems may require the user name, birthday, address, phone
number and bank account number; online insurance services may require the user name, birthday,
phone number and driver’s licence; online taxation services may require the user name, phone number
and tax number. Dynamic changes of the identities cause the corresponding resultant private key be
invalid. A trivial solution could be that when a user wants to change his identities, he asks the PKG
to generate a new private key. This might be reasonable if the user changes all of his old identities
at the same time. However, it might not be the case in practice, since a user might want to change
only some of his identities. If we follow the trivial solution, a complete re-computation process has to
be carried out, even if only a single identity needs to be added or removed. It would be desirable if
the multi-identity private key can be dynamically updated, in the sense that a new identity can be
added or an existing identity can be deleted without the re-computation of the private key initially
generated by the PKG. 1
Practical applications usually require some common basic identities, such as user name, birthday,
phone number, address, etc. If all of these basic identities are created as a credential, then a user
who has these basic identities can keep one private key corresponding to multiple identities. When a
new identity is involved, PKG only needs to authenticate this new identity and compute a private key
corresponding to this new identity. Furthermore, a new resultant private key is computed by the user
using credential and the new private key from PKG. For example, when a client wants to connect to
his/her bank account, he/she asks PKG to generate a private key corresponding to his/her account
number. Since he/she can compute the resultant private key related to the basic identities and the
1It seems that there is no motivation for the user to delete an identity, because even if it doesnt delete an identity, it
still can establish session keys with other users by following the protocol. Therefore we only considered the scenario of
adding a new identity in this paper.
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account number, his/her bank can use the client’s basic identities plus the account number to establish
a shared key with the client. When a client wants to connect to his/her online insurance services,
he/she asks PKG to generate a private key corresponding to his/her driver’s licence.
Based on the above observation, we present an efficient dynamic identity-based key management
protocol in this paper. Our scheme exhibits the following features:
• A user can dynamically update his private key.
• Our scheme is efficient in terms of the communication cost.
• The security of our scheme can be reduced to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
All the existing schemes do not naturally accommodate the feature of dynamical private-key up-
date. However, we observe that the scheme in [11] implies a dynamical key update feature, but it is
conditional, i.e., it requires the PKG to save random numbers used in the private key setup phase
for each user. Since a PKG could serve many users, this requirement introduces an additional key
management workload for the PKG. This requirement also contradicts the traditional requirement to a
PKG, where it does not need to save any parameters for a privacy key generation. Note that although
the scheme in [13] allows a user’s identities change dynamically, the user’s private key is unchanged.
This does not meet our “dynamically key management” requirement. The other drawback of the
existing schemes is the computation and communication cost, in that the cost is proportional to the
number of all identities used for the private key computation or the number of the selected identities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the preliminaries including
bilinear pairing, security assumption and security model. In Section 3, we analyze three kinds of
key extract algorithms and explain which one can be used to construct dynamical private keys. In
Section 4, we present a dynamic multi-identity key management protocol and compare our scheme
with all known schemes in terms of computation, communication and dynamic property. In Section
5, we prove the security of the multi-identity key management protocol. In Section 6, we conclude the
paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the background knowledge that will be used for our scheme. We give
the basic definition and properties of bilinear pairings, the computational problems and the security
model.
2.1 Bilinear Map
We first revisit the basic definition of bilinear map and the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. The
detail can be found in [4].
The bilinear map ê is defined over two groups of the same prime-order q denoted by G and GT in
which the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. Formally, we have the following definition:
Definition 1 (Bilinear Map) Let G is an additive group of prime order q and GT a multiplicative
group of the same order. Let P denote a generator of G. An admissible pairing is a bilinear map
ê : G×G→ GT which has the following properties:
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• Bilinear: given Q, R ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q, we have ê(aQ, bR) = ê(Q,R)ab.
• Non-degenerate: ê(P, P ) 6= 1GT .
• Computable: ê is efficiently computable.
Typically, the map ê can be derived from either the Weil pairing or Tate pairing on an elliptic
curve over a finite field. More details on how these groups, pairings and other parameters should be
selected in practice for efficiency and security can be found in [4, 9, 14].
2.2 Computational Problems
Bilinear map captures an important cryptographic problem, i.e., the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
problem, which was introduced by Boneh and Franklin [4].
Definition 2 (BDH) Let G and GT be two groups of a prime order q ≥ 2k, where k is security
parameter. Let P ∈ G∗ be a generator of G. Suppose that there exists a bilinear map ê : G×G→ GT .
Let ABDH be an attacker modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine taking the security parameter
k as input. Suppose that a, b and c are uniformly chosen at random from Z∗q and aP , bP and cP
are computed. ABDH is to solve the following problem: Given (G,GT , q, ê, P, aP, bP, cP ), compute
ê(P, P )abc. We define ABDH ’s success probability as
SuccBDHG,ABDH (k) = Pr[A
BDH outputs ê(P, P )abc].
We denote by SuccBDHG (tBDH) the maximal success probability Succ
BDH
G,ABDH (k) over all attackers
having running time bounded by tBDH which is polynomial in the security parameter k.
Definition 3 (negligible function) A real-valued function f(l) is negligible if for any polynomial p(l),
there exists a positive integer c ∈ N such that when ∀l > c, |f(l)| < 1p(l) always hold.
The BDH problem is said to be computationally intractable if SuccBDHG (tBDH) is negligible in k.
2.3 Security Models
In this paper, we will analyze the security of our protocols using a security model which was initially
proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in [1] and extended to the public key setting by Blake-Wilson et al.
in [2], and later extended to the identity-based key agreement by Chen et al. [7]. The model includes
a set of parties and each party involved in a session is modeled by an oracle. An oracle Πsi,j denotes
an instance of a party i involved with a partner party j in a session s where the instance of the party
j is Πtj,i for some t. These parties cannot communicate directly; instead they only communicate with
each other via an adversary. An adversary can access the oracle by issuing some specified queries as
follows.
Send(Πsi,j , m): This query models an active attack. Π
s
i,j executes the protocol and responds with
an outgoing message x or a decision to indicate accepting or rejecting the session. If the oracle Πsi,j
does not exist, it will be created. Note that if m = λ, then the oracle is generated as an initiator;
otherwise as a responder.
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Reveal(Πsi,j): Π
s
i,j returns the session key as its response if the oracle accepts. Otherwise, it returns
⊥. Such an oracle is called opened.
Corrupt(i): The party i responds with its private key.
Test(Πsi,j): At some point, the adversary can make a Test query to a fresh oracle Π
s
i,j . Π
s
i,j , as
a challenger, randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with the real agreed session key, if b = 0;
otherwise it returns a random sample generated according to the distribution of the session key.
The security of a protocol is defined using the two-phase game G played between a malicious
adversary A and a collection of oracles. At the first stage, A is able to send the above first three
oracle queries at will. Then, at some point, A will choose a fresh session Πsi,j on which to be tested
and send a Test query to the fresh oracle associated with the test session. After this point, the
adversary can continue querying the oracles but can not reveal the test oracle or its partner, and
cannot corrupt the entity j. Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit b′ for b.
We say that A wins if the adversary guesses the correct b.
Define the advantage of A as:
AdvA(k) = | 2 Pr[b′ = b]− 1 |,
where k is a security parameter.
The fresh oracle in the game is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Fresh oracle [8]) An oracle Πsi,j is called fresh if (1) Π
s
i,j has accepted; (2) Π
s
i,j is
unopened; (3) j 6= i is not corrupted; (4) there is no opened oracle Πtj,i, which has had a matching
conversation to Πsi,j.
In this work, we use the concatenation of the messages in a session to define the session ID, thus
to define the matching conversation, i.e., two oracles Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i have a matching conversation to
each other if both of them have the same session ID.
A secure authenticated key agreement protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 5 Protocol Π is a secure authenticated key agreement protocol, if:
• In presence of the benign adversary (who faithfully relays messages between parties), on Πsi,j and
Πtj,i, both oracles always accept holding the same session key and this key is distributed uniformly
at random on session key space;
• For every probability polynomial time(PPT) adversary A, AdvA(k) is negligible.
3 Pairing-based Key Extract Algorithms
It is necessary to revisit key extraction methods and highlight their applications in key agreement,
since key extraction plays an important role in our protocol.
Chen, Cheng and Smart [7] pointed out two types of pairing-based key extract algorithms that
have been used in identity-based key agreement schemes. We notice that there is another one used in
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encryption schemes as pointed out by Boyen [5]. We call them “Exponent Inversion Extract”, “Com-
mutative Blinding Extract” and “Full Domain Hash Extract”, respectively. However, we observed
that only the last one can be used to construct a dynamical key extract algorithm.
Exponent Inversion Extract. This algorithm was first introduced by Sakai and Kasahara [16].
Given the pairing parameters, an identity string IDA for a user A, a hash-function H1 : {0, 1} → Zq,
the master private key s ∈ Zq, and the master public key R = sP ∈ G, the algorithm computes
α = H1(IDA) ∈ Zq and dA = 1s+αP ∈ G. The values TA = αP + R = (s + α)P ∈ G and dA will be
used as the public and private key pair respectively corresponding to A’s identity IDA. The value s
is kept secret by the PKG, and the master public key R is made available to every user.
The encryption scheme given in [10] and the key agreement protocol presented in [12] are based
on this key extract algorithm. In both schemes, the corresponding private key for user A is dA =
1Qn
i=1(s+αi)
P ∈ G according to the above definition. Since the inverse of the sum of the master key s
and the hash value αi of identity IDA,i is the coefficient of the public parameter P , it is hard for a
user to dynamically compute a private key by himself.
Note that if we construct dA = (
∑n
i=1
1
s+αi
)P ∈ G, the user can generate a new private key d′A.
However, the message T generated by the intended recipient B should contain user A’s identities and
meanwhile satisfy ê(d′A, T ) = ê(P, P )
r where r is the random value chosen by user B. Thus T should
have the form 1Pn
i=1
1
s+αi
P ∈ G, which is hard for user B to compute due to the hardness of the discrete
logarithm on ellipse curves. Therefore this kind of key extract algorithm can not be used to construct
dynamical key extract algorithm.
Commutative Blinding Extract. This algorithm was first proposed by Boneh-Boyen [3] to
construct identity-based encrypt scheme without random oracle. Given the pairing parameters, an
identity string IDA ∈ Zp for a user A, the master public key < g, g1, g2, h1 > where g is a random
generator in G∗, g1 = gα where α ∈ Zp, g2 ∈R G, h1 ∈ G, and given the master private key gα2 ∈ G,
the algorithm computes dA = (gα2 · (g
IDA
1 h1)
r, gr).
The scheme given in [11] is based on this key extract algorithm. The private key in this scheme
has the form dIDi = (d1, d2) = (g
α
2 (hk
ID1
1 · · · k
IDi
i k
IDn
n )
r, gr), where ki are public and r is generated
by PKG. However, this scheme is only conditionally-dynamic due to the structure of this kind of key
extract algorithm. More precisely, if a user wants to add a new identity, whether he can compute a
new private key depends on whether PKG can remember the same random value for the same user.
If PKG uses the same random value to compute the corresponding private keys for the new identities
from a user, then this user can update his private key dynamically. However, the disadvantage is
that PKG has to remember many pairs (IDi, rIDi) for all users. Therefore, this kind of key extract
algorithm cannot be used to construct dynamical key extract algorithm.
Full Domain Hash Extract. This algorithm was first proposed by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara
[17]. Given the pairing parameters < q, ê,G,GT > where ê : G×G→ GT , an identity string IDA for
a user A, a hash-function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, the master private key s ∈R Z∗q , and the master public
key R = sP ∈ G where P is the generator of G. The algorithm computes QA = H1(IDA) ∈ G and
dA = sQA ∈ G. The values QA and dA will be used as the public and private key pair corresponding
to A’s identity ID.
In this case, the corresponding private key for user A should be dA =
∑n
i=1 sQA,i ∈ G according
to the above definition. Since the master key s is the coefficient of the hash value of identity IDA,i,
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user A can compute the new private key dynamically by himself. Therefore, in this paper we adopt
this kind of derivation algorithm.
4 A Dynamic Multi-identity key management Protocol
In this section, we present a dynamic multi-identity key exchange protocol. Suppose two parties A
and B want to establish a shared session key using this protocol. A holds m IDs (IDA,1, IDA,2, · · · ,
IDA,m) and B holds n IDs (IDB,1, IDB,2, · · · , IDB,n).
4.1 The Scheme
Our scheme consists of three algorithms: Setup, Extract and Key Agreement.
• Setup: On input a security parameter `, the PKG chooses a cyclic additive group G and a
cyclic multiplicative group GT with prime order q, where G is generated by P and there exists a
bilinear map ê : G×G→ GT . The PKG chooses a random s ∈ Z∗q as the master secret and sets
Ppub = sP . The PKG also chooses a random Q ∈ G and chooses cryptographic hash function
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G. The system parameter list is params =(G,GT , ê, P, Ppub, Q,H1).
• Extract: Given useri identity tuple (IDi,1, · · · , IDi,n), this algorithm takes as input master-
secret s and generates the private key as follows:
– Compute Pi,u = H1(IDi,u) where 1 ≤ u ≤ n.
– Choose a random ri,u ∈ Z∗q and computes R′i,u = ri,uP .
– Compute S′i,u = ri,uQ+ sPi,u.
– Compute Si =
∑n
u=1 S
′
i,u and Ri =
∑n
u=1R
′
i,u.
– Send the private key di = (Si, Ri) to useri through an authenticated and private channel.
• Key Agreement: Suppose user A is an initiator and has m identities, B is an intended partner
and has n identities. Suppose A and B are in the different domain, then they should
have different system parameters, i.e., paramsIdent =(G,GT , ê, P, P Identpub , QIdent, HIdent1 )
where Ident = {A,B} and P Identpub = sIdentP . Note that G,GT , ê, P can be selected as
the same from the standard parameters sets, while sIdent, QIdent, HIdent1 are selected
by users’ PKG. A and B select a hash function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}r, and they have
the private key as dA and dB, respectively.
Let PA,j = HA1 (IDA,j), PB,j = H
B
1 (IDB,j). A wants to use k
′ identities (IDB,1, · · · , IDB,k′)
from B’s identity set where k′ ≤ n. Similarly, B wants to use k identities (IDA,1, · · · , IDA,k)
from A’s identity set where k ≤ m.
To establish a shared session secret key, A and B conduct the following tasks:
– A selects a random value x ∈ Z∗q , and computes TA,1 = xP , TA,2 = −xQB and TA,3 =
x
∑n
j=k′+1 PB,j . A sends TA = (TA,1, TA,2, TA,3) to user B.
– Upon receiving a message TA, B selects a random value y ∈ Z∗q , and computes TB,1 = yP ,
TB,2 = −yQA and TB,3 = y
∑m
j=k+1 PA,j . B sends TB = (TB,1, TB,2, TB,3) to user A.
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After the exchange, A computes the session secrets as
KAB,1 = ê(SA, TB,1) · ê(TB,2, RA) · ê(TB,3,−PApub) · ê(
k′∑
j=1
PB,j , P
B
pub)
x.
and
KAB,2 = x · TB,1 = xyP.
Similarly, B computes the session secret as
KBA,1 = ê(SB, TA,1) · ê(TA,2, RB) · ê(TA,3,−PBpub) · ê(
k∑
j=1
PA,j , P
A
pub)
y.
and
KBA,2 = y · TA,1 = xyP.
Remark 1 It is very easy for a user to compute a new private key when he adds new identities.
For example, when user A adds a new identity IDA,m+1 to his identity set, he asks a new private
key corresponding to this new identity from PKG. PKG authenticates this new identity and generates
a private key dA,m+1 = (S′A,m+1, R
′
A,m+1) where S
′
A,m+1 = rA,m+1Q
A + sAPA,m+1 and R′A,m+1 =
rA,m+1P . Once receives the private key dA,m+1, A can aggregates this private key with the old one to
compute a new private key d′A = (S
′
A, R
′
A) as follows:
S′A = SA + S
′
A,m+1 =
∑m
j=1 S
′
A,j + S
′
A,m+1 =
∑m+1
j=1 S
′
A,j ,
R′A = RA +R
′
A,m+1 =
∑m
j=1R
′
A,j +R
′
A,m+1 =
∑m+1
j=1 R
′
A,j .
4.2 Correctness
We verify the correctness of the protocol. Take user A as an example.
KAB,1 = ê(SA, TB,1) · ê(TB,2, RA) · ê(TB,3,−PApub) · ê(
k′∑
j=1
PB,j , P
B
pub)
x
= ê(
m∑
j=1
sAPA,j , yP ) · ê(
m∑
j=1
rA,jQ
A, yP ) · ê(−yQA,
m∑
j=1
rA,jP ) · ê(y
m∑
j=k+1
PA,j ,−sAP )
·ê(
k′∑
j=1
PB,j , P
B
pub)
x
= ê(
k∑
j=1
sAPA,j , yP ) · ê(
m∑
j=k+1
sAPA,j , yP ) · ê(y
m∑
j=k+1
PA,j ,−sAP ) · ê(
k′∑
j=1
PB,j , s
BP )x
= ê(
k∑
j=1
PA,j , s
AP )y · ê(
k′∑
j=1
PB,j , P
B
pub)
x
= ê(
k∑
j=1
PA,j , P
A
pub)
y · ê(
k′∑
j=1
PB,j , P
B
pub)
x.
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Similarly, B computes the session key as
KBA,1 = ê(SB, TA,1) · ê(TA,2, RB) · ê(TA,3,−PBpub) · ê(
k∑
j=1
PA,j , P
A
pub)
y
= ê(
k∑
j=1
PA,j , P
A
pub)
y · ê(
k′∑
j=1
PB,j , P
B
pub)
x.
Thus, the two secret keys computed by A and B are equal and A and B have successfully established
the shared key K1 = KAB,1 = KBA,1 and K2 = KAB,2 = KBA,2 after running an instance of the
protocol. The final shared session key is then sk = H2(A‖B‖TA‖TB‖K1‖K2).
4.3 Efficiency Analysis and Comparison
We compare our scheme with other existing schemes. Note that Scheme 2 [12] and Scheme 4 [13]
are key agreement schemes, while Schemes 1 [10] and Scheme 3 [11] are actually encryption schemes,
which can be used as key agreement schemes run by two users. Suppose user A has m identities and
k selected identities.
Schemes Computation (A+M+P) Communication Dynamic Security Reduction
Scheme 1 [10] O(m) +O(m) + 2 m+ 2 no q-BSDH
Scheme 2 [12] O(m) +O(m) + 2 m+ 1 no k-MBCAA1
Scheme 3 [11] 1 +m+ 3 m+ 2 conditional DBDH
Scheme 4 [13] O(k) +O(k) + 3 k yes∗ BDH
Ours O(m) + 4 + 4 3 yes BDH
Table 1: The comparison of the proposed scheme and other schemes. “A” denotes addition operation
on G, “M” denotes scalar multiplication operation on G, and “P” denotes pairing operation, respec-
tively. ∗Scheme 4 allows the user to change its identities dynamically, while keeps the private key
unchanged.
From table 1, we can find that our protocol is more efficient than Scheme 1, Scheme 2 and Scheme 4.
We observe that Scheme 3 needs only one addition operation while our scheme needs O(m). However,
Scheme 3 needs m scalar multiplication operations which are much more expensive than the addition
operation. Therefore, our scheme is more efficient in comparison to Scheme 3, if m > 4 in terms of
the computation cost. In terms of the communication cost, only our scheme offers a constant size
of the messages exchanged. Scheme 4 is better than ours only when k ≤ 2. Thus, considering both
computation and communication costs, our scheme exhibits the best efficiency.
Our scheme and Scheme 4 are the only schemes that offer a full dynamical key update feature.
Note that Scheme 4 allows the user to change its identities dynamically, while keeping the private
key unchanged. In our scheme, the private key changes with the change of the user’s identities. We
cannot regard Scheme 3 as dynamic, since the PKG has to store the random value for every user for
computations of private keys.
From the last column, we can see that Scheme 1 is based on a strong security assumption named
Bilinear Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (q-BSDH for short). Unfortunately, the security proof for
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Scheme 1 is pointed out to be incorrect [12]. The security for Scheme 2 relies on a new assumption
called k-multiple bilinear collision attack assumption (k-MBCAA1 for short) which is proved to be
equivalent to the known k-bilinear collision attack assumption. However this security assumption is
too strong. Scheme 3 is based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption, while
Scheme 4 and our scheme are based on the computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption
which is the weakest assumption among all of the above assumptions.
5 Security Analysis
Theorem 1 If H1 and H2 are random oracles and the BDH assumption holds, then our dynamic
multi-identity scheme is a secure key agreement protocol. Suppose A is an adversary that attacks
the multi-identity scheme in the random oracle model with non-negligible probability ε and makes at
most q1, q2 queries to H1 and H2, respectively, and creates at most qo oracles. Then there exists an
algorithm B to solve the BDH problem with advantage
AdvBDHB ≥
1
q1 · qo · q2
· ε.
Proof: For simplicity, we assumed that all users belong to the same PKG. This assumption would not
affect the security proof. 2
We define Session ID as a concatenation of TA ‖ TB. We focus on how to construct an algorithm
B using the adversary A to solve a BDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Given an instance of the BDH problem
〈q, k,G,GT , ê, P, aP, bP, cP 〉
where ê is a bilinear pairing ê : G×G→ GT , B’s task is computing ê(P, P )abc.
Setup: B simulates the Setup algorithm as follows:
B chooses a random value y ∈ Z∗q and computes Q = yP . Then B sets Ppub = aP where a is the
master key which is unknown to the simulator. After that, B chooses two hash functions H1 and H2,
and sends the system parameters 〈G,GT , ê, P,Q, Ppub, H1, H2〉 to A. The hash functions H1 and H2
are random oracles controlled by B.
Algorithm B randomly chooses I ∈R {1, · · · q1}, J ∈R {1, · · · , qo} and K ∈R {1, · · · , n} and begins
its simulation. Here, we should note that notation IDi,u means the u-th chosen identity of user i,
and Πsi,j is the s-th oracle among all the created oracles. Also note that n
t
i,j means the number of the
identities j chooses from i’s identities set in this session. For simplicity, we assume that each party
has n identities. Algorithm B answers the queries which are asked by adversary A in arbitrary order
as follows.
H1(IDi,u) queries: Algorithm B maintains an initially empty list H list1 with entries of the form
(i, IDi,u, hi,u, di,u, vi,u). When A queries the oracle H1 at a point IDi,u, B responds to the query
as follows:
2When users belong to the different domains, the only difference is that the simulator needs to prepare two sets of
system parameters < G, GT , ê, P, Qi, P ipub, Hi1, H2 > and < G, GT , ê, P, Qi, P
j
pub, H
j
1 , H2 > (i ,j are different users) to
the adversary, where only Qi, Ppub and H1 are different. Then the simulator can use these corresponding parameters to
proceed the proof according to the description of the protocol. Thus this assumption would not affect the security proof.
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• If IDi,u already appears on the H list1 in a tuple (i, IDi,u, hi,u, di,u, vi,u), then B responds with
H1(IDi,u) = hi,u.
• If IDi,u is the J-th unique query to H1 and (i, u) = (I,K), then B selects a random value
vi,u ∈ Z∗q and stores (i, IDi,u, bP,⊥, vi,u) into the tuple list and responds with H1(IDi,u) = bP .
• Otherwise, B firstly selects li,u ∈ Z∗q and vi,u ∈ Z∗q randomly, then computes H1(IDi,u) = hi,u =
li,uP and di,u = li,u · aP . B inserts (i, IDi,u, hi,u, di,u, vi,u) into the tuple list and responds with
H1(IDi,u) = hi,u.
H2(IDi, IDj , T ti , T
t
j ,K
t
1, Z
t) queries: B maintains an initially empty list H list2 with entries of the form
(IDi, IDj , T ti , T
t
j ,K
t
1, Z
t, ζt) which is indexed by (IDi, IDj , T ti , T
t
j ,K
t
1, Z
t). B responds to the query
in the following way.
• If a tuple indexed by (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt1, Zt) is on the list, then B responds with ζt.
• Otherwise, B goes though the list L to find a tuple (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Πti,j) and proceeds as
follows.
– Note that since there are three messages in each message tuple T ti and T
t
j , let m
T ti
k (k =
1, 2, 3) denote the k-th message of message tuple T ti and m
T tj
k (k = 1, 2, 3) the k-th message
of message tuple T tj . Test if ê(m
T ti
1 ,m
T tj
1 ) = ê(P,Z
t) holds. If the equation holds, B does
the following:
∗ Find the values f ti,j and SKti,j corresponding to oracle Πti,j from the list Ω in the Send
query.
∗ Find the value ltj,u from H list1 for party with IDj .
∗ Compute the shared secret via the following equation
Ktij,1 = ê(Si,m
T tj
1 ) · ê(m
T tj
2 , Ri) · ê(m
T tj
3 ,−Ppub) · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1
hi,u, aP )f
t
i,ja
= ê(
n∑
u=1,u6=K
li,uaP + vi,uyP,m
T tj
1 ) · ê(
1
f ti,j
Zt, bP ) · ê(m
T tj
2 ,
n∑
u=1
vi,uP )
·ê(m
T tj
3 ,−Ppub) · ê(
ntj,i∑
j=1
li,uaP, aP )f
t
i,j .
Note that Πti,j is put on the list L in the Reveal query only when πti,j has been revealed
and di,u = abP (u ∈ {1, · · · , n}), but H2(IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt1, Zt) had not been queried
before the Reveal query. So, SKti,j has been randomly sampled.
∗ Set ζt = SKti,j .
∗ Remove (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Πti,j) from the list L. Put (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt1, Zt, ζt) into
the list H list2 .
∗ Return SKti,j .
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– Otherwise, B chooses ζt ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, inserts (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt1, Zt, ζt) into the
list and returns ζt.
• Otherwise, B chooses ζt ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, inserts (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt1, Zt, ζt) into the list and
returns ζt.
• If a tuple indexed by (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt) is on the list, then B responds with ζt.
• Otherwise, B chooses ζt ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, inserts (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Kt1, Zt, ζt) into the list and
returns ζt.
Corrupt(IDi) queries: When receiving this query, B goes through list H list1 . If IDi,u (u ∈ {1, · · · , n})
is not on the list, B queries H1(IDi,u). B checks the value of di,u. If di,u =⊥, then B aborts the game
(Event 1). Otherwise, B computes
Si =
n∑
u=1
(di,u + vi,uyP ) =
n∑
j=1
(li,uaP + vi,uyP ), Ri =
n∑
u=1
vi,uP.
B sends di = (Si, Ri) to A.
Send(Πti,j , N) queries: B maintains a list Ω for each oracle of the form (Πti,j , tranti,j ,rti,j , Ktij,1,
Ktij,2,SK
t
i,j). tran
t
i,j is the transcript of the oracle so far; r
t
i,j is the random integer used by the
oracle to generate the messages; Ktij,1,K
t
ij,2 and SK
t
i,j are set ⊥ initially. This list is updated in other
queries as well. B proceeds in the following way:
• B looks through the list H list1 . If j is not on the list, B queries H1(IDj,u) where 1 ≤ u ≤ ntj,i.
• B checks t.
– If t = J , B checks the values of dj,u and gives the different response depending on it as
below.
∗ If there exists a tuple in H list1 such that dj,K = ⊥ and K ∈ {1, · · · , ntj,i}, then let
m1 = cP . Compute
m2 = −c · yP = −y · cP, m3 = c
n∑
u=ntj,i+1
hj,u =
n∑
u=ntj,i+1
lj,ucP,
where lj,u can be found from H list1 . Respond them along with cP and set r
t
i,j = ⊥.
∗ Otherwise, B aborts the game (Event 2).
– If t 6= J , B proceeds the protocol as follows.
∗ If all of di,u 6= ⊥, randomly sample rti,j ∈ Z∗q and respond with
(rti,jP,−rti,jyP, rti,j
n∑
u=ntj,i
lj,uP ).
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∗ Otherwise, randomly sample f ti,j ∈ Z∗q and respond with
(f ti,jaP, f
t
i,jayP,−f ti,j
n∑
u=ntj,i+1
lj,uaP ).
Reveal(Πti,j) queries: B maintains a list L with tuples of the form (IDi, IDj , Ti, Tj ,Πti,j). B answers
the queries as follows:
• Get the tuple of oracle Πti,j from Ω.
• If oracle Πti,j has not accepted, respond with ⊥.
• If t = J or if the J-th oracle has been generated as ΠJa,b and IDa = IDj , IDb = IDi and two
oracles have the same session ID, abort the game (Event 3).
• If SKti,j 6= ⊥, return SKti,j .
• Otherwise,
– If ri,j 6= ⊥, compute
Kij,1 = ê(Si,m1) · ê(m2, Ri) · ê(m3, aP ) · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1
lj,uP, aP )r
t
i,j ,
where m1, m2 and m3 are the received messages on tranti,j . By making an H2 query, set
SKti,j = H2(IDi, IDj , T
t
i , T
t
j ,Kij,1, r
t
i,jm1),
where
T ti = (r
t
i,jP,−rti,jyP, rti,j
n∑
u=ntj,i+1
lj,uP ), T tj = (m1,m2,m3),
if Πti,j is an initiator oracle, or SK
t
i,j = H2(IDj , IDi, T
t
j , T
t
i ,Kij,1, r
t
i,jm1) otherwise, and
update Ω by putting SKti,j and return SK
t
i,j as the response.
– Otherwise, it should have di,u = abP where u = K. Since B does not know di,K and should
not be able to compute ê(m1, abP ), thus should not be able to compute Ktij,1. B proceeds
as follows:
∗ Go though the list H2 to find a tuple (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Ktij,1, Zt) if IDi is the initiator
or a tuple (IDj , IDi, T tj , T
t
i ,K
t
ij,1, Z
t) otherwise, meeting the equation ê(f ti,jaP,m1) =
ê(P,Zt). If such Zt is found, then compute
Ktij,1 = ê(Si,m1) · ê(m2, Ri) · ê(m3,−Ppub) · ê(
ntj,i∑
j=1
hi,u, aP )f
t
i,ja
= ê(
n∑
u=1,u 6=K
(li,uaP + vi,uyP ),m
T tj
1 ) · ê(
1
f ti,j
Zt, bP ) · ê(m2, Ri) · ê(m3,−Ppub)
·ê(
ntj,i∑
j=1
li,uaP, aP )f
t
i,j
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and set
SKti,j = H2(IDi, IDj , T
t
i , T
t
j ,K
t
ij,1, Z
t),
where
T ti = (r
t
i,jP,−rti,jyP, rti,j
n∑
u=ntj,i+1
lj,uP ), T tj = (m1,m2,m3),
if Πti,j is an initiator oracle, or SK
t
i,j = H2(IDj , IDi, T
t
j , T
t
i , K
t
ij,1, Z
t) otherwise.
∗ Otherwise, randomly sample SKti,j ∈ {0, 1}n, put (IDi, IDj , T ti , T tj ,Πti,j) if IDi is the
initiator or (IDj , IDi, T tj , T
t
i ,Π
t
i,j) into list L.
∗ B returns SKti,j as the response and update Ω by putting SKti,j .
Test(Πti,j) query: If t 6= J or (t = J but) there is an oracle Πsj,i which has the same session ID as Πti,j
that has been revealed, B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise, B responds to A a random number
ζ ∈ {0, 1}n.
After A finishes the queries, it returns its guess. Then B proceeds with the following steps:
Compute
D = ê(Si,m1) · ê(m2, Ri) · ê(m3, aP ),
where m1, m2 and m3 are the incoming messages. Also note that Si =
∑n
u=1 li,uaP + vi,uyP and
Ri =
∑n
u=1 vi,uP where li,u 6= ⊥ and vi,u 6= ⊥ can be found from H list1 corresponding to identifier
IDi,u. Note that
KJi,j = D · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1
Qj,u, aP )c
= D · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1,u6=K
lj,uP, aP )c · ê(bP, aP )c
= D · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1,u6=K
lj,ucP, aP ) · ê(P, P )abc.
B randomly samples Kl from the H list2 , and responds
Kl/(D · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1,u 6=K
lj,ucP, aP ))
to the BDH challenge.
Claim 1 If B did not abort the game, A could not find inconsistence between the simulation and the
real world. More precisely, if A noticed the inconsistence between the simulation and the real world
when B did not abort the simulation, then the probability B solves the BDH problem is non-negligible.
14
Proof: B gives the satisficatory responses to most of the oracles by following the protocol specification
honestly, except for the one Πti,j whose private key is abP and H(IDi,k) = bP and the incoming
messages (m1,m2,m3) is from the tested oracle where m1 = cP . Note that the transcripts are one
part of the input to H2 which is modelled as the random oracle to compute the session key. If there
is some difference between the reveal query on Πti,j and a query on H2, it must have queried H2 with
Πti,j such that
Ktij,1 = ê(Si,m1) · ê(m2, R2) · ê(m3,−aP ) · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1
lj,uP, aP )r
t
i,j
= ê(
∑
u=1,u6=K
li,uaP, cP ) · ê(abP, cP ) · ê(m2, R2) · ê(m3, aP ) · ê(
ntj,i∑
u=1
lj,uP, aP )r
t
i,j
If A can distinguish the session key Ktij,1 in the simulation from the real world, then B can return
Kl
ê(
∑
u=1,u6=K li,uaP, cP ) · ê(m2, R2) · ê(m3,−aP ) · ê(
∑ntj,i
u=1 lj,uP, aP )
rti,j
.
as the response to the BDH challenge with probability 1q2 , where Kl is a random value choosing from
H2 by B. This completes the proof.
Claim 2 During the simulation, the probability that B did not abort the game is non-negligible.
Proof: We now evaluate the probability that B did not abort during the game, i.e., Events 1 - 4 did
not happen. B aborts the game only when at least one of following events happens:
1. Event 1, denoted as F1: A corrupted party i whose private key of K-th identity is represented
by ⊥, i.e., A made a query to party i to get its private key if it chose Πsj,i as the fresh oracle,
which is disallowed according to the definition of the fresh oracle.
2. Event 2, denoted as F2: A impersonated party i whose private key of K-th identity is represented
by ⊥ in the s-th session.
3. Event 3, denoted as F3: A revealed the J-th oracle or its partner oracle, which is against the
definition of the fresh oracle.
4. Event 4, denoted as F4: A did not choose the J-th oracle as the challenge fresh oracle or the
parter of the fresh oracle has been revealed, which made that the test query can not work.
According to the rules of the game, we have
¬F4 ∧ ¬F2 → ¬F1
and
¬F4 → ¬F3.
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Now, let F be the event that B did not abort during the game. Then, we get
Pr[F ] = Pr[¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 ∧ ¬F3 ∧ ¬F4]
= Pr[¬F2 ∧ ¬F4]
= Pr[¬F2] · Pr[¬F4]
≥ 1
q1
· 1
qo
=
1
q1 · qo
.
Claim 3 Let H be the event that K = ê(Si,m1) · ê(m2, Ri) · ê(m3,−aP ) · ê(
∑ntj,i
u=1 hi,u, aP )
c was not
queried on H2. Then Pr[¬H] ≥ ε.
Proof:
It is easy to obtain
Pr[A wins| H] = 1
2
.
Since
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H] + Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]
≤ 1
2
Pr[H] + Pr[¬H]
=
1
2
Pr[¬H] + 1
2
and
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|¬H] · Pr[¬H] + Pr[A wins|H] · Pr[H]
≥ 1
2
Pr[H]
=
1
2
− 1
2
Pr[¬H],
So we have
Pr[¬H] ≥ 2|Pr[A wins]− 1
2
| = ε.
Thus, the claim is correct.
Let I be the event that B found the correct Kl. Then combining all of the above results, we have
Pr[B wins] = Pr[F ∧ ¬H ∧ I]
≥ 1
q1 · qo · q2
· Pr[¬H]
≥ 1
q1 · qo · q2
· ε,
which contradicts to the hardness of the BDH problem.
This completes the security analysis of the protocol. 
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6 Conclusion
We have proposed a novel dynamical identity-based authenticated key management protocol to opti-
mize key management for a user with multiple identities. Our scheme allows a user with some basic
identities to compute a new private key when some new identities are involved. We have proved our
scheme in the random oracle model with the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our protocol has
demonstrated obvious advantages in comparison with other schemes, especially for high efficiency in
terms of communication, since it only needs constant-size number of messages for communication.
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